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ABSTRACT 
 
Almost all parts of Iran are seismic hazard prone areas and due to the low quality of 
constructions as well as the increase of exposure in urban areas, recent earthquake events caused 
unacceptable huge losses, both in human and economic terms. To assess the resilience of various 
risk bearers, including the government as well as private sector entities, the resources to cope 
with potential future events as well as possible interdependencies during the occurrence have to 
be analyzed in detail. Furthermore, to pro-actively act against possible future extremes with risk 
hedging instruments such as insurance, the underlying risk has to be determined in a quantitative 
manner. This paper suggest how to combine both, the coping dimension as well as the risk 
dimension, to determine possible risk management strategies which may be feasible in the 
Iranian context. The focus is specifically on risk instruments, such as insurance, for the Shiraz 
region in Iran, where newly produced probabilistic loss estimates are available which are 
subsequently used to analyze possible insurance schemes and for determining corresponding 
premium payments as well as affordability. The paper discusses how such risk instruments can 
be embedded within an integrated framework and which additional options, such as risk 
reduction or risk pooling, would be beneficial to lower premiums to affordable levels. 
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ABSTRACT 
 
 Almost all parts of Iran are seismic hazard prone areas and due to the low quality of constructions 
as well as the increase of exposure in urban areas, recent earthquake events caused unacceptable 
huge losses, both in human and economic terms. To assess the resilience of various risk bearers, 
including the government as well as private sector entities, the resources to cope with potential 
future events as well as possible interdependencies during the occurrence have to be analyzed in 
detail. Furthermore, to pro-actively act against possible future extremes with risk hedging 
instruments such as insurance, the underlying risk has to be determined in a quantitative manner. 
This paper suggest how to combine both, the coping dimension as well as the risk dimension, to 
determine possible risk management strategies which may be feasible in the Iranian context. The 
focus is specifically on risk instruments, such as insurance, for the Shiraz region in Iran, where 
newly produced probabilistic loss estimates are available which are subsequently used to analyze 
possible insurance schemes and for determining corresponding premium payments and 
affordability. The paper discusses how such risk instruments can be embedded within an 
integrated framework and which additional options, such as risk reduction or risk pooling, would 
be beneficial to lower premiums to affordable levels. 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Iran is one of the most earthquake-prone countries in the world. In the 20th century alone, 22 
major earthquakes have happened and claimed over 150,000 lives. Part of the reason for the 
exceptional high human and economic losses in the past, include the failure of most physical 
structures to withstand the impact [1]. As indicated, also the economic losses for different risk 
bearers, e.g. the government or households, were huge and difficult (or even impossible) to be 
financed without any assistance. Fig. 1 shows total direct loss estimates for major earthquakes 
which have happened in the recent past and recovery investments to finance them. What can be 
noticed is the discrepancy between financing needs and available financing resources. In all 
cases there is a gap between earthquake losses and recovery investments but it’s worthwhile to 
note that the absolute gap is completely different for each event. This has, as it is often the case, 
also to do with political aspects and media attention [2]. 
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Figure 1.     Past major earthquake losses in IRAN [3]. 
 
 The high level of seismicity in combination with a high physical vulnerability of 
structures leads to a high earthquake risk level for Iran and therefore is unacceptable and has to 
be managed in some way. Basically, there are two main approaches to manage the risk: risk 
spreading and risk mitigation methods. The main focus here is on risk spreading instruments, 
such as insurance, and will be applied within a specific case study, namely for Shiraz city. 
However, before considering possible risk management schemes one has to assess the current 
financial vulnerability of the government and households against potential catastrophe losses (we 
focus here mostly on households). Such kind of analysis is needed to detect the risk level at 
which the different risk bearers are assumed to behave risk averse, and therefore would be 
interested in risk spreading instruments such as insurance. In other words, it is assumed that only 
the risk which cannot be absorbed without any major difficulties via current resources should be 
hedged, for example via insurance.  
 
 In order to quantify the financial vulnerability of households against earthquake events, 
first, the situation of the households after past major earthquake events is investigated in detail 
and the total resource stock available to finance the losses is assessed. In a next step, the 
financial vulnerability of the households against catastrophe events is assessed by comparing the 
maximum financing resources with the potential losses earthquake events could cause. This 
enables us to determine the risk level for a given risk bearer, i.e. we assess the probability that an 
earthquake event would cause losses which exceed the ability of the risk bearer to finance them, 
or in other words that a financing gap occurs [4]. In a next step this information is used to 
suggest possible insurance schemes and corresponding premiums to hedge the remaining risk.   
 
Assessing Current Financial Vulnerability of Households 
 
In order to assess the current financial vulnerability of households against extremes, the loss 
financing instruments used in past major earthquake events have been investigated in detail. It 
was found that households, especially the low income ones, very much rely on government 
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assistance and insurance. However, the later one only plays a very small role, about 2-3 percent 
of total losses. Government assistance came in different forms, for example, giving subsidized 
long term low-interest loans, providing technical assistance (including design, consultation, and 
implementation), monitoring, preparing plans and designs for earthquake resistance structures, 
repairing infrastructure (road construction, debris removal, piping), grant construction material 
and other resources, as well as supporting the poor. Here, the focus will be on financial resources 
needed to recover from losses and current financial vulnerability of households is determined 
given the current available ex-post or ex-ante measures. Furthermore, it is assumed that: 
- a one year time horizon, i.e. the disaster is assumed to happen at the beginning of the year 
and the financial situation of the households at the end of the year is calculated thereafter 
- a range of k different ex-post financial instruments the government/households can or 
may use is available  
- the ex-post measures come into play immediately after the disaster happens and are 
available without any time delay. 
It should be noted that we used the inflation rate based on the statistical data of Iran [5] for 
transforming current values into constant ones. 
 
One way in providing an estimate of the financial vulnerability of the households which is 
useful for insurance purposes is by calculating the critical year event or critical return period. It 
is defined as the smallest (earthquake) year event which causes the financing gap for the first 
time. In other words, the critical year event causes the depletion of all resources available which 
can be used for after an event but would not cause a financing gap (and hence all losses still can 
be financed) [4]. Consequently, for quantifying the financial vulnerability, the maximum amount 
of instruments/resources which can be used after the disaster must be calculated first. In order to 
find all possible financial resources available which can be used after earthquakes, passed loss 
payments for recent earthquakes have been studied and transformed to constant dollars using the 
inflation rate already mentioned above. Generally speaking, based on this previous earthquake 
loss financing analysis in Iran, the possible instruments include loans, grants, donor assistance 
(in terms of relief goods or cash), insurance and indirect payments of the government to the 
earthquake hit regions. Figure 1 shows two examples of loss payments by different instruments 
after the Bam 2003 earthquake and after the 2012 earthquake in Azerbaijan, which caused 2094 
and 822 million $ losses, respectively. It is important to note that the magnitude of the Bam and 
Azerbaijan earthquake were only around 6.5 and 6.4 in magnitude but caused very high losses. 
An indication that even moderate earthquakes can cause exceptional losses due to the high 
structural vulnerability of the buildings in Iran. 
 
   
 
Figure 2.     (a) Loss financing resources used in Azarbaijan earthquake (2012) and (b) Bam 
earthquake (2003). 
 
Based on Fig. 2 the largest part of the losses to households are paid by low interest and 
long term loans; it should be kept in mind that such loans are just providing enough money to 
construct a small house, approximately around 60-70 square meters, and for compensating only 
part of the actual losses. As both figures suggest, the high amount of unpaid losses as well as the 
risk of getting a smaller house after an event (as not enough resources available to fully rebuilt to 
pre-event structures) indicate a need to further investigate possible risk management strategies, 
including risk financing instruments such as insurance, an insurance pool, catastrophe bonds or 
some mitigation measures to decrease the underlying risk. Table 1 summarizes the estimated 
available resources based on detailed case study analysis of the 7 most recent earthquake events 
(under the assumptions given above). 
 
Table 1.     Maximum amount of financing resources of households for disaster losses in Iran. 
Replacement 
Loan  (urban 
buildings)  
($) 
Repair 
Loan 
($) 
Grants 
($) 
Insurance 
payment 
(% of 
total loss) 
Donor 
assistance
(% of 
total loss) 
Government 
Indirect 
assistances 
(% of the 
loan) 
10086 2824 1210 1.54 1 30 
 
In more detail, there are three types of loans available for people after earthquake events, 
a loan for constructing urban buildings, another one for constructing rural buildings and the other 
one for repairing the buildings. If the losses are less than a specified percentage of total value of 
a) Available financing resources used 
after the Azarbaijan Earthquake (2012)
Loans
Insurance
Donors
Infrastructures
grants
Unpaid Losses
b) Available financing resources available 
after the Bam earthquake (2003)
Loans (Internal Banks and World bank)
Insurance
Donors
Infrastructures
grants
Unpaid Losses
the structure, the household can get a repair loan and if losses are larger, they can get access to a 
replacement loan from the government. The specified percentage is assumed to be around the 
30% value (based on past analysis). The grant is an assistance of the government to all 
households and focus on living costs after the earthquakes. As indicated the insurance 
penetration in Iran is very low but past earthquake events have shown that the claims have been 
rapidly paid after the events. About 10% of the buildings have earthquake insurance coverage 
[6]. Donor assistance which can be in monetary terms or via relief goods were variable for each 
earthquake in the past, but is small and around 1% of total losses. 
Additional to the assessment of the possible resources available to finance losses it is 
necessary to estimate the probability of a given earthquake event and corresponding losses such 
an event would cause. We rely on newly produced earthquake risk estimates for Shiraz city for a 
comprehensive set of structures [7]. Let’s call the loss distribution for a given building F and the 
maximum amount for a given event and given resource i (=1,...,k) as bi. Using all the financial 
resources available the critical return period can be calculated as in Eq. 1: 
 
Critical return period = 
∑
=
−
k
i
ibF
1
)(1
1
 
                                                                               (1) 
 
The buildings analyzed here (see [7]) are classified in regards to three building codes 
related to the year of constructions (Pre-code, moderate-code and high-code) which is based on 
several editions of the Iranian seismic codes [8], i.e. buildings constructed before 1991, from 
1991 to 2005 and after 2005 are related to Pre, moderate and high-code, respectively. 
Furthermore, we distinguish between steel, concrete and masonry type of structures as well as 
differentiated according to number of stories. The critical return period for all types of buildings 
have been calculated using the approach explained above and corresponding results are shown in 
Table 2. 
 
Table 2.     Critical return period for different building classes in Shiraz city. 
 
Types of 
buildings 
Number 
of stories 
Critical year Event 
Pre-Code Moderate-Code High-Code 
Steel 1-3 7 71 449 
4-7 9 69 200 
> 8 8 39 87 
Concrete 1-3 7 59 443 
4-7 8 69 315 
> 8 - - 128 
Masonry 1-2 12 123 1248 
3 7 119 698 
 
Note, the smaller the critical year event, the higher the risk (and vice versa). The smallest 
number and therefore highest risk (in terms of financial vulnerability) shown in Table 2 is for 
pre-code, 1-3 story, steel structures; the critical year event is estimated to be a 7 year event which 
means that, on average, every 7 years such an household will experience a financing gap, or in 
other words a situation where losses are larger than their maximum amount of resources 
available to finance them. This result is (while important) rather unsurprising as this kind of 
buildings are occupied mostly by rather poor households with small resources as well as high 
structural vulnerability (hence, the small numbers for the whole pre-code building column). The 
opposite is the case for the high-code column in Table 2. Another important issue to be 
considered is the fact that the critical return period is increasing very sharply from pre-code to 
moderate-code buildings and also from moderate-code to high-code buildings. The results are 
very important as it will give indications which households may want to decrease risk via risk 
spreading instruments such as insurance. Possible insurance schemes for earthquake risk for Iran 
based on these results are presented next. 
 
Catastrophe Insurance in Iran 
 
The results in the last section showed that especially buildings constructed before 1991 and 
between 1991 and 2005 are at high risk. In Iran insurance could play an important role to repay 
the losses immediately after earthquakes and therefore help to decrease possible negative long 
term consequences for risk bearers as well as stabilizing budget planning processes over longer 
time horizons. However, currently there is no separate insurance coverage for earthquake risk 
available in Iran; it is only included as an option for fire insurance. Based on past experiences of 
other countries on earthquake insurance, the inclusion of earthquake as a standard peril within a 
fire policy was generally restricted to home insurance and to areas where earthquake risk was 
considered negligible [9]. 
 
Regarding what type of insurance schemes would be most promising ones, we already 
noted that not all of the risk bearer is exposed to, needs to be transferred to the insurance sector 
(only the part of the risk he is not able to cover by himself). The critical year event concept gives 
some indications which kind of risk needs to be transferred and is coupled now with some 
specific insurance schemes, specifically Excess-of-Loss reinsurance types. 
 
Large unbalanced risks like catastrophe risks are usually insured as non-proportional 
treaties where the reinsurer contractually agrees to pay for a certain layer of losses, i.e. the 
ceding insurer (or risk bearer) bears the losses up to a certain point (called the attachment point 
or deductible), and afterwards the (re-)insurer steps in, but usually only up to a maximum limit 
(called the exit or exhaustion point) (see [10], [11]). One type of non-proportional reinsurance is 
Excess-of-Loss (XL) reinsurance. It is the dominant reinsurance cover for natural disasters [10 
and 11].  
 
The use of risk based premiums does not just provide an insurance company with a way 
of enhancing its competitiveness through being able to attract good risks by providing more 
attractive terms and deterring bad risks by high premiums, deductibles or other means. It also 
makes earthquake insurance not only important for the recovery process of disaster management, 
but also can create incentives for disaster mitigation [12].Risk based premiums are therefore very 
important to raise risk awareness of the households and paying more attention to earthquake 
resistant constructions and using mitigation measures to decrease the inherent risk, which 
consequently would also lower the premiums. 
 
However, a probabilistic risk assessment of the region is needed to calculate risk-based 
premiums. Exceedance probability curves (EP curve) based on probabilistic risk assessment of 
the region for each building class (again based on [7]) are used for calculating the corresponding 
risk-based premiums for all building types in Table 1. One example of EP curves used here for 
Shiraz city is shown in Fig 3. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.    Exceedance probability curve for Steel structure, 4-7 story buildings [7]. 
 
In combination of the financial vulnerability of risk bearers (households or the 
government) in Iran, a general structure of insurance systems can be proposed and are shown in 
Figs.4 and 5. In the first proposed insurance system shown in Fig.4 all resources which are 
normally available after the earthquakes for financing the disaster are included and the insurance 
coverage would start exactly after the financing gap (critical) year event. This proposed 
insurance system has three layers: the first layer includes government assistance, the second 
layer is the insurance cover which covers all the losses after the financing gap year event and the 
last layer is the residual risk. Another proposed financing system which can be potentially viable 
for Iran (see Fig.5), has a separated insurance system in which the households don’t rely on 
government assistance. In this insurance scheme, there are three layers which includes a 
deductible, the insurance coverage and again residual risk (the deductible will be paid by 
households [13]). 
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Figure 4.    The general structure of the first proposed financing system. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.    The general structure of the second proposed financing system. 
 
The premium calculations are done assuming actuarial fair as well as loading factor based 
approaches (see [7]). In the following, we want to examine the affordability of the insurance 
systems and focus on the first scheme as (due to government assistance) is the cheapest option 
(for households, not for the government). In order to examine the affordability of risk-based 
premiums, the average annual income of each household is selected and compared with their 
corresponding premiums. The maximum claim payment in the current earthquake insurance 
system which is a part of fire insurance is about 0.45% of average annual income for each 
household in Shiraz [5]. As current premiums can implicitly compensate a maximum of 50% of 
the actual losses for a 100 m2 house, it implicitly (based on the EP curves) can be stated that 
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these maximum loss payments are mostly related to a 250 year event (the design based structure 
in the Iranian seismic code (2800 standard code) is a 475 year) and therefore could be assumed 
to be the exit point of the proposed insurance contracts. Table 6 and 7 show the preliminary 
results for premiums based on percentage of average annual income for each household building 
types. It is notable that Earthquake Insurance Risk Index for Iranian buildings have been 
calculated in 2011 [14]. 
 
Table 6. Premiums based on percentage of average annual income of each household for the first 
proposed insurance system.   
 
Types of 
buildings 
Number 
of stories 
Different Exit points 
Pre-Code Moderate-Code High-Code 
50 100 250 475 50 100 250 475 50 100 250 475 
Steel 1-3 16.3 21.1 23.9 26.6 0.0 0.0 1.5 3.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
4-7 13.7 18.4 21.3 24.3 0.0 0.0 1.3 2.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
> 8 14.6 19.6 22.8 26.1 0.0 2.2 3.7 5.5 0.0 0.0 0.2 1.4 
Concrete 1-3 16.3 21.0 23.7 26.2 0.0 0.0 1.5 3.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
4-7 14.7 19.4 22.3 25.1 0.0 0.0 1.3 2.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
> 8 - - - - - - - - 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.1 
Masonry 1-2 6.2 10.4 12.9 15.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
3 14.7 19.0 21.4 23.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
(-) there is no building with defined features. 
 
In table 6 almost all numbers for the high-code buildings and also partly for the 
moderate-code buildings for 50 and 100 year event exit points are zero (mostly because they do 
not need insurance based on their financial vulnerability). For moderate-code buildings with 250 
and 475 year events as exit points, the premiums rates are between 1 and 6 percent and therefore 
already rather expensive. Most of the premiums for pre-code buildings are more than 10 percent 
of annual income and therefore can be seen as un-affordable for this household group. The range 
of the numbers for moderate-code buildings is significantly less than the pre-code buildings. For 
example, premiums for 1 to 3 story, pre-code steel structures with 475 year event exit point is 
26.6 but for the moderate-code one is only 3.2. This indicates that the building code or year of 
construction is the most important single component which can change the losses and premiums 
drastically. Consequently, structural mitigation can greatly reduce costs and therefore should be 
analyzed in combination with financial risk instruments such as the insurance schemes presented 
here. 
  
Conclusions 
 
We analyzed possible insurance schemes for Iran based on a probabilistic framework which 
included the financial vulnerability of risk bearers. Critical return periods for pre-code and 
moderate code buildings are found to be very small which means that households are highly 
financial vulnerable. The results are mainly driven due to the high structural vulnerability of 
these structures. In this group, even with government assistance most households are at high risk 
and even more troublesome, the premiums in percentage of total household income are very high 
and mostly unaffordable. Consequently, there is need to think about innovative ways to decrease 
premiums. Options could range from subsidizing premiums to strategies which pool independent 
risks over Iran (similar to the Caribbean Catastrophe Insurance Facility, CCRIF). However, 
while the former may cause market distortions the later may be difficult to establish if risks are 
correlated over different regions too much. One other promising option could be to link 
premiums with structural mitigation efforts. As shown in [6], mitigation measures could greatly 
reduce structural risk and therefore could also lower premiums to affordable levels. This could 
also enable to switch the importance of government assistance (as in the proposed insurance 
scheme one) to more market based ones (as proposed in insurance scheme two). More analysis is 
needed to combine these two approaches and to detect best options under limited amount of 
budgets. Nevertheless, the approach presented here could be a promising way forward to 
incorporate risk reduction and risk financing within a holistic risk-based framework which is of 
high importance within current policy discussions in Iran on how to reduce effectively the 
vulnerability to earthquake risk. 
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